On September 23, Morocco renewed the 395 seats of the House of Representatives, with over 15.8 million registered voters. Official results favored the Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM), which came in first with 97 seats. Behind it came the National Rally of Independents (RNI) and the Istiqlal, both tied at 66 seats, followed by the PJD, which staged a strong recovery with 54 seats compared to just 13 in 2021. Voter turnout, at approximately 38%, is the second lowest since 1997—just above the historic low of 37% recorded in 2007—and well short of the 50% seen in 2021. However, the legislative vote that year coincided with municipal and regional elections, a setup that naturally drives higher mobilization. This national picture, nonetheless, masks significant regional disparities. In stark contrast to the national trend, voter participation in the southern regions—the disputed territory of Western Sahara, claimed by Morocco—was exceptionally high (77% in Laâyoune-Sakia El Hamra, 61% in Dakhla-Oued Eddahab). This points to a deep attachment to state institutions in those areas, where voting is also experienced as an assertion of belonging to Morocco.
Government Formation and the Prospect of a Female Premier
For now, no party holds the 198 seats required to govern alone. Forming a government will necessitate a coalition, and the Constitution mandates that the head of government be chosen from the party that finished first. This has fueled speculation about a potential female prime minister in the person of Fatima Zahra Mansouri, the PAM’s coordinator. Outgoing Prime Minister Aziz Akhannouch publicly acknowledged his opponents’ victory, while the PAM described the outcome as a “national responsibility” rather than a partisan triumph, signaling openness to other political forces.
Economic Progress vs. Social Discontent
The vote takes place at a time when Morocco can boast genuine economic progress — yet this growth alone is not translating into greater trust in institutions, especially among the young. While the country’s economy continues to grow, this growth is not translating into greater trust in institutions. The advancements are clear: inflation dropped from 6.6% in 2022 to 0.8% in 2025, and the country is pushing forward with massive infrastructure investments—valued at an estimated $20 billion—partly in preparation for the 2030 World Cup, which it is co-hosting with Spain and Portugal. On the institutional front, the electoral law allocates 90 of the 395 seats to regional candidate lists legally reserved exclusively for women. This corrective mechanism guarantees a level of female representation in Parliament that would otherwise be far harder to secure if left solely to party choices in ordinary single-member districts. These advances coexist with structural problems that the election highlighted rather than resolved. Despite falling inflation, the perception that purchasing power is shrinking remains widespread, while unemployment among youth aged 15 to 24 approaches 37%—against a national average of around 13%—a gap that weighs heavily on the younger generations.
Youth Disengagement and the Shadow of Ceuta
It is precisely among the youth that the widest gap from politics is recorded: a mere 4% of registered voters are aged 18 to 24, compared to 29% of over-60s. The protests by the Gen Z 212 movement in the autumn of 2025, sparked by demands regarding healthcare, education, and employment, did not translate into electoral mobilization. Many young people chose abstention as a form of conscious protest against “the rules of the game,” ideally continuing their street demonstrations. In the background lies the migration crisis in Ceuta: in late July, roughly 60,000 people—mostly youths—attempted to cross the border into the Spanish exclave. While the phenomenon was not a central campaign issue, it was interpreted as yet another symptom of the same youth distress underlying the protests, rather than an independent cause of voter apathy. Its most direct and localized effect was on election-day security, with reinforced border controls following online calls for a new crossing coinciding with the vote. Finally, compounding this lack of trust is the handling of the post-2023 earthquake recovery: the slowness and opacity of rebuilding in the affected areas remain a persistent grievance fueling anti-establishment sentiment. The result is a country that is growing economically and presenting itself to the world through the 2030 World Cup as a showcase, yet struggling domestically to bridge the divide between citizens—especially young people and the urban, educated middle class—and the political class. A 38% turnout is not merely a technical statistic, but a warning flare signalling protest against the entire system, well beyond individual political parties.
Beyond various analytical angles, Morocco’s era of massive infrastructure and economic growth is running on a track that does not always intersect with that of a substantial portion of its citizens, particularly the youngest ones, who remain on the margins of this very narrative of progress.
