The United States’ peace plan to end Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine requires, among other things, Kiev’s acceptance of a substantial renunciation of its contingent of men and military equipment. The document states: no more than 600,000 soldiers, in the Russian-American version, and 800,000 in the European one. All this without a substantial security guarantee that would protect Ukraine from renewed Russian aggression, nor automatic diplomatic-military mechanisms, modeled on Article 5 of the Atlantic Pact.
Ukraine’s distrust is therefore obvious, as, from this point of view, it has, as they say, “already given,” with the disastrous results clear for all to see. This is why its President Volodymyr Zelensky and his European allies are distrustful. Aside from all the other unfair clauses in the potential take-it-or-leave-it agreement dished out by the histrionic White House resident.
Why do we say that Ukraine “has already given”? To understand this, we need to go back to the proclamation of independence of this nation, born, or should we say reborn—because the National and People’s Republic of Ukraine had already seen the light between 1917 and 1921, that is, before the birth of Soviet Russia in 1922—after the referendum of December 1, 1991, and the separation from the Soviet Union. The divorce left the newly reborn nation with a respectable nuclear arsenal, consisting of 176 missiles, a large number of strategic bombers, and extensive nuclear support infrastructure. The persistence of this enormous arsenal, despite pressure from the United States—concerned solely with preventing the nuclear proliferation of the republics born from the dissolution of the USSR—and the anti-nuclear sentiments of domestic public opinion, was nevertheless rightly understood by the new nation’s leaders as a tool capable of guaranteeing their own security, beyond its intrinsic quality as a negotiating object.
The leaders of the newly reborn nation quickly found themselves, completely unprepared, faced with a terrible dilemma: retain possession of this military arsenal as a deterrent against possible—or, if we look at history with hindsight, probable—future aggression—at the risk of remaining isolated by a reluctant international community—or forgo this formidable means of deterrence that fate had placed at their disposal, in order to present themselves to the world as a nation oriented toward peaceful coexistence, especially with its neighbors, despite their intact military capabilities and their historical, and unresolved, hegemonic tendencies.
With the signing of the Budapest Memorandum on December 5, 1994, at the end of a lengthy internal and international negotiation process, Ukraine yielded to US pressure and decided to cede its strategic arsenal to the Russian Federation in exchange for a promise to see its sovereignty and territorial integrity respected. Aside from Russia and Ukraine, the Memorandum was countersigned by two guarantors, Bill Clinton for the United States and John Mayor for the United Kingdom. Indeed, they were not guarantors but witnesses or sponsors, because the Memorandum did not contain “guarantees” but simply “assurances” given on the basis of a promise that in exchange for the delivery of the arsenal to Russia, the latter would refrain from resorting to force against Ukraine in the event of future territorial disputes. As we know, this promise was not kept.
This Memorandum is a very weak document, lacking any “guarantees,” which the then Ukrainian president, Leonid Kuchma, inexplicably and imprudently signed. It was drafted in the form of a simple “declaration” and not a binding “treaty” to be ratified by the respective parliaments. Indeed, the Russian parliament, the State Duma, despite Ukraine having naively completed the delivery of nuclear warheads in 1996, carefully refrained from ratifying it, as did the other signatories.
It is obvious that today, President Zelensky, this time mindful of the strategic-diplomatic failures of his predecessors, having already resigned himself to swallowing the bitter pill of the loss of sovereignty, partial or total, over the invaded territories, does not want to add to the burden by repeating past naiveté, fortunately supported in this regard by his European partners.
Therefore, the most burning points of the treaty proposed by Trump and amended by the EU concern the “sovereignty of Ukraine,” which must be respected and reaffirmed. Ukraine must have “robust, legally binding security guarantees,” not mere “assurances” as was done in Budapest. These guarantees must mirror NATO’s Article 5 to prevent Ukraine from being attacked again in the future, even though NATO is not currently involved. Possible NATO membership, which Trump’s plan does not envisage, must depend on the consent of NATO members. As for membership in Europe, this is not up for discussion.
However, there is a fundamental issue. What value does the word of a superpower have in this day and age if, as Russia has done in the past and continues to do today, it can afford to disobey agreements signed like the one in Budapest, can afford to veto the UN Security Council ceasefire order, and ignore the vote of the overwhelming majority of its assembly? What value does such a word have if it can daily commit against Ukraine and its defenseless population those war crimes, conspiracy against peace and against humanity for which, at the end of the Second World War, it, together with the Allies, tried and executed Nazi criminals: crimes for which Russia, formerly Soviet, now Federal, was responsible, then as now (at least for the two war years against Poland, Finland and Baltic Countries)?
And if Russia’s word has no value, what is the point of signing agreements with it? And what sense will there be, after these signatures, in restoring diplomatic, commercial, customs, free trade, and transit relations and connections, putting an end to the past, when we know full well that this past will never be over, and that Russia will stubbornly, albeit sometimes subtly, continue to lay claim to the territories liberated following the dissolution of the USSR and to implement every maneuver, both overt and covert, legal and illegal, predictable and unpredictable, aimed at regaining possession, if not sovereignty, of them?
No value. And Putin himself tells us this in every way, even though we don’t want to listen: any territory where a Russian is present, that territory is Russian.
However, sooner or later, a peace agreement will need to be signed and put an end to the massacre, by both sides, of hundreds of thousands of soldiers and civilians. How can this be done? As Zelensky explicitly told Trump during their infamous first meeting at the White House: “We are on the front lines, while you, the United States, are well protected on the other side of the Atlantic.” Trump then angrily retorted that Ukraine, just as Europe, did not have the necessary cards in its deck to play. True, neither he nor Europe has the necessary cards (read: the power) to speak, and so to guarantee ourselves and the agreements we make, including the one we will sign to guarantee Ukraine, we will need to have the necessary cards in our deck, with bells on.
How else will Europe be able to sign the security guarantees necessary to enforce, even militarily, an agreement that will protect Ukraine and Europe itself from future Russian aggression, as well as automatic mechanisms “modeled on Article 5 of the Atlantic Pact” but without the United States — which, according to Trump, will be excluded from such guarantees? —Therefore, Europe will have to equip itself with a common and integrated tactical-strategic defense system capable of providing deterrence and intervention.
Recursus ad alterum non datur.
It’s no surprise that Europe, comprised of 27 of the world’s richest states, with a total population of nearly 450 million and an aggregate GDP of nearly €20 trillion, ranking it the world’s third-largest economic entity, is considered completely irrelevant as a global political and military power. This is because it is not, in fact, a unitary state, comparable to the United States, albeit a federal one, or China. Europe has a common currency, but it lacks a single government, a unified economy, and, above all, a common defense. Europe, all due distinctions made, is today more or less in the same position as Italy was before its unification in 1847, when Goffredo Mameli wrote the famous anthem, “Il Canto degli Italiani.” Not everyone knows that our anthem consists of six stanzas, not just one as we are accustomed to singing. Well, the second verse reads as follows:
“For centuries we have been trampled upon and mocked
Because we are not a people, because we are divided
Let a single flag unite us, a single hope
The hour has already struck for us to unite.”
Europe finds itself in precisely this situation: despite its economic power, it is not considered a valid interlocutor with whom to discuss and conclude treaties, such as the peace treaty between Russia and Ukraine. For this reason, it is often kept on the sidelines and forced to chase events rather than determine them.
It must not be this way anymore!
